Abstract. A MIX net takes a list of ciphertexts (c1; ; cN) and outputs a permuted list of the plaintexts (m1; ; mN) without revealing the relationship between (c1; ; cN) and (m1; ; mN). This paper shows that the Jakobsson's ash MIX of PODC'99, which was believed to be the most e cient robust MIX net, is broken. The rst MIX server can prevent computing the correct output with probability 1 in our attack. We also present a countermeasure for our attack.
The original MIX net was proposed by Chaum 4] . B.P tzmann and A.P tzmann, however, showed an attack by a sender, which is more complicated than a simple repeated ciphertext attack 14].
Another problem of Chaum's MIX net, based on RSA, is that the size of each ciphertext c i is very long proportionally to the number of MIX servers v.
Park et al. overcame this problem by using ElGamal encryption scheme so that the size of each c i became independent of v 13] . Almost all MIX nets proposed after this paper are based on ElGamal encryption scheme. A general method to achieve veri ability is to have each MIX server to prove that he behaved correctly in zero knowledge. Sako and Kilian 15] showed such an e cient proof system for Park et al.'s MIX net. This scheme is the rst universally veri able MIX net.
On the other hand, Ogata et al. showed the rst robust MIX net which is also universally veri able 12]. In this scheme, the computational cost of each MIX server is O( tN) and the external veri er's cost is also O( tN), where is the security parameter and t denotes the number of malicious MIX servers.
At Eurocrypt'98, Abe showed a robust MIX net in which the external verier's cost is reduced to O( N) 1] . At the same time, Jakobsson showed a more e cient robust MIX net, called practical MIX 8] In this paper, however, we show that ash MIX is broken. In our attack, the rst MIX server can prevent computing the correct output with probability 1. This means that his security proof is wrong. Our attack is a variant of the DK attack for practical MIX 5] . We also present a countermeasure for our attack. It will be a further work to study about the security of our countermeasure.
Flash MIX consists of the rst re-encryption phase, the second re-encryption phase and the unblinding protocol in which each MIX server proves that he behaved correctly in the rst and the second re-encryption phases. Now our malicious rst MIX server executes the rst re-encryption phase honestly, but cheats in the second re-encryption phase. He computes his invalid output lists from not only his input lists of the second re-encryption phase but also the input to the ash MIX itself so that no cheating is detected in the unblinding protocol.
Other related works. Abe showed MIX nets which are e cient for small N 2, 3] . In Abe's MIX nets, the cost of each MIX server is O(tN log N). Jakobsson and Juels showed a MIX net which has the same advantage in 11]. In their MIX net, the cost of each MIX server is O(tN log 2 N). Since these complexities grow faster in N than the other schemes, these schemes suit small N. { t-veri ability if an incorrect output of the MIX net is detected with overwhelming probability.
{ t-robustness if it can output (m 1 ; ; m N ) correctly with overwhelming probability.
We say that a MIX net is t-resilient if it satis es t-privacy, t-veri ability and t-robustness.
ElGamal based encryption scheme for users
Let p be a safe prime, i.e., p; q be primes such that p = 2q + 1, and g be a generator of G q . Let y = g x mod p, where x is a secret key. The public key of ElGamal encryption scheme is (p; q; g; y). 
Functionality
The input to ash MIX is a list of ciphertexts Flash MIX starts with t + 1 MIX servers, say, MIX servers 1; t + 1. If cheating is detected during any step of the protocol, then a cheater detection phase commences. In the cheater detection phase, a cheater is detected and replaced. Afterwards, the protocol is restarted.
It consists of two subprotocols, the blinding protocol and the unblinding protocol.
Blinding protocol
Flash MIX rst executes the blinding protocol as follows. 
Unblinding protocol
After the blinding protocol, the unblinding protocol is executed in which each MIX server proves that he behaved honestly in the blinding protocol.
(1) Verifying the rst re-encryption. Each MIX server reveals the re-encryption exponents and the random permutation which he used in the rst re-encryption. They are checked by the other MIX servers. In this phase, each MIX server proves that he behaved honestly about the product of all elements except the second dummy of each list in the second re-encryption. If no cheater was found, then dummies are removed from the re-encrypted and permuted rst list copy, and the resulting list is output.
Security
The DK attack 5] for practical MIX 8] does not work for ash MIX directly because two dummy elements are inserted into the input list at the beginning of the protocol in ash MIX. Actually, Jakobsson argued the security of ash MIX as follows 10, Proof of Theorem 1]. In order to successfully alter some elements in the nal output, the adversary has to alter at least two elements of the re-encrypted and permuted rst list copy, none of which are the second dummy. (See Step (4) and (6) of the previous subsection.) In order for this not to be noticed in the step where lists are relatively sorted and compared, the adversary has to select the same two elements from the remaining ? 1 list copies.
He claimed that this probability was smaller than . (See eq. (2) for .) In the next section, however, we show that this claim is not true.
Attack for the Blinding Protocol
In the blinding protocol of ash MIX, our malicious MIX server 1 executes the rst re-encryption honestly, but cheats in the second re-encryption. He computes his invalid output lists L 0 1;1 ; ; L 0 ;1 from not only his input lists L 0 1;0 ; ; L 0 ;0 of the second re-encryption phase but also the input to the ash MIX itself (L 0 of eq. (1)). See Fig.3 and Fig.4 . Now our malicious MIX server 1 executes the second re-encryption phase as follows.
(1) MIX server 1 rst chooses random numbers 1 ; ; N such that 1 + + N = 1mod q: 
Attack for the Unblinding protocol
We next show that MIX server 1 can behave properly in each phase of the unblinding protocol so that no cheating is detected.
Theorem 1. MIX server 1 can behave properly so that the verifying the rst re-encryption phase ends successfully.
Proof. Our MIX server 1 executed the rst re-encryption phase honestly. Therefore, he can execute the verifying the rst re-encryption phase correctly. On the other hand, from eq. (9) In this section, we show a countermeasure for our attack. The blinding protocol is unchanged. The new unblinding protocol is as follows.
(1) Open dummies of the rst re-encryption.
Each MIX server publishes how he permuted the two dummies in the rst re-encryption. He next proves that he knows the re-encryption exponents of the two dummies in zero-knowledge. Unchanged.
Note that 1. (1) is newly introduced. In (1), the re-encryption exponent of the second dummy is not revealed. 2. (4) was put at the beginning of the unblinding protocol in the original scheme. Then our attack does not work. Theorem 1, 2 and 4 hold. However, Theorem 3 does not hold.
It will be a further work to study about the security of our countermeasure.
